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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
its enactment prior to codification should have legal effect." Parti-
cularly is this true where the statutes are incorporated into a statutory
compilation which is more than a mere collection of statutes but is
instead a revision of them, thus involving affirmative consideration
of the merits of the legislation contained in the enactment. However,
a majority of the courts have adopted a contrary view,"4 and in Hines
v. Harmon,' a case heavily relied upon by the court in the instant
decision, it was held that statutes brought into a revision do not have
an equal status because of their simultaneous passage.
La Ven C. Neff
WILLS-NO CONTEST CLAUSE-ACCELERATION OF REMAIN-
DERS.-The will of testatrix left her estate in trust for the benefit
of defendant for life with remainder to defendant's children and in
default of issue of the defendant to the plaintiff if living, otherwise
to plaintiff's children. The plaintiff and defendant were the sole heirs
at law of the testatrix. Included in the will was a provision that any
person contesting the will was to receive one dollar in lieu of all
other provisions made by the will. Notwithstanding this provision
the defendant brought suit to contest the will and lost. The executors,
in filing their final account, petitioned the court to distribute the
estate to plaintiff on the ground that the defendant had forfeited her
life estate because of the contest, thus accelerating the 'plaintiff's
contingent remainder. The provision in favor of defendant's children,
it was argued, could never become operative because defendant was
incapable of having children by reason of a surgical operation. The
court held that by reason of the contest intestacy resulted as to the
life estate, but that the contingent remainder of the plaintiff could
not be accelerated so as to include in it the life estate; that the life
estate must be distributed according to the laws of intestacy; and that
defendant, as an heir at law, was entitled to one half of it. In re
LeFranc's Estate, 232 P.2d 4 (Cal.App.1951).
According to the overwhelming majority of American courts,
vested remainders, whether created by deed or by will, are acceler-
23 Cf. Barth v. Ely, 85 Mont. 310, 278 Pac. 1002 (1929).
23 Hopkins v. Superior Court, 105 Cal.App. 133, 286 Pac. 1053 (1930);
Pedro v. Hapai, 28 Haw. 744 (1926).
25 178 Okla. 1, 61 P.2d 641 (1936,).
RECENT CASES
ated upon failure of the preceding life estate.1 Although there is a
substantial number of cases to the contrary,' the modern trend seems
to extend this doctrine to contingent remainders, by ignoring the
distinction between vested and contingent remainders after the failure
of the testamentary life estate.! Although the theory of acceleration
of contingent remainders is contrary to the established principle of
seisin which requires that upon the premature termination of the
supporting freehold estate the contingent remainder is automatically
destroyed, courts favoring acceleration explain this deviation from
the orthodox doctrine by basing their decision upon the necessity of
following the testator's intention. "The doctrine (of acceleration of
remainders) is founded upon the presumed intention of the testator
that the remainderman should take on the failure of the previous
estate, notwithstanding the prior donee may still be alive, and is
applied in promotion of the presumed intention of the testator and
not to defeat his intention."4
Another way of avoiding the consequences of the destructibility
doctrine commonly resorted to is to regard the contingent remainder
as an executory interest by relating back the failure of the preceding
life estate to the testator's death.' The Oklahoma court, in the com-
paratively recent case of Thomsen v. Thomsen,' dealing with the most
common situation involving acceleration, i.e. the wife's renunciation
of the life estate given to her by the will, charges the testator with
knowledge of the right of the wife to elect whether to take under
the will or under the statute and imputes to the testator the intention
that the wife's election to take her statutory share in lieu of the
estate "is, in legal contemplation, equivalent to her death." The
reasoning of the case is characteristic of the modern majority rule
accelerating contingent remainders.
Besides Indiana, where the courts give various reasons for deny-
ing acceleration,' California seems to be the only jurisdiction which
consistently refuses to adopt the majority view. The main obstacle
to such adoption seems to be § 780 of the California Civil Code (Deer-
ing 1937),' interpreted by the California courts so as to exclude
acceleration entirely. So in the case of In Re Arms' Estate' heavily
relied on by the principal case, involving the problem of acceleration
Northern Trust Co. v. Wheaton, 249 Ill. 606, 94 N.E. 980 (1911); Safe
Deposit & Trust Co. v. Gunther, 142 Md. 644, 121 At. 479 (1923); In
7e Mcllhattan's Will, 194 Wis. 113, 216 N.W. 130 (1927).
Compton v. Rixey's Ex'rs., 124 Va. 548, 98 S.E. 651 (1919); Branden-
burg v. Thorndike, 139 Mass. 102, 28 N.E. 575 (1885); In re Lawrence,
37 Misc. 702, 76 N.Y.Supp. 653 (1902); see Rocker v. Metzger, 171 Ind.
364, 86 N.E. 403 (1908) which illustrates the rule in that state.
Roe v. Doe, 5 Boyce 545, 93 At. 373 (1914); O'Rear v. Bogie, 157 Ky.
666, 163 S.W. 1107 (1914); In re Disston's Estate, 257 Pa. 537, 101 At.
804 (1917).
Sherman v. Flack, 283 IM. 457, 119 N.E. 293, 294 (1918)'; See Notes, 5
A.L.R. 473 (1920); 17 A.L.R. 314 (1922); 62 A.L.R. 206 (1929) 164
A.L.R. 1433 (1946).
' Wakefield v. Wakefield, 256 Ill. 296, 100 N.E. 275 (1912); Crossan v.
Crossan, 303 Mo. 572, 262 S.W. 701 (1924); 3 Simes, Law of Future
Interests § 715 (1936).
196 Okl. 539, 166 P.2d 417 (1946).
Cool v. Cool, 54 Ind. 225 (1876).
"When a remainder on an estate for life or for years is not limited on a
contingency defeating or avoiding such precedent estate, it is to be deemed
intended to take effect only on the death of the first taker, or the expira-
tion, by lapse of time, of such term of years."
' 186 Cal. 554, 199 Pac. 1053 (1921).
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upon the widow's renunciation of the testamentary life estate, the
Supreme Court of California reversed the decree of the probate court
accelerating the remainder and held that, as to the renounced life
estate, intestacy resulted and the widow was entitled to share in it
in her capacity as heir at law. Proceeding on this analogy, the court
in the principal case reaches an identical result. It also follows the
same line of argument as In re Arms' Estate, supra, and In re Mathie's
Estate," namely that despite the clause limiting distribution to a
contesting legatee to one dollar no disinheritance resulted. On this
point the California court is in complete agreement with other juris-
dictions.
In considering In re Arms' Estate, supra, Simes expressed doubt
as to whether § 780 of the Califonia Civil Code' was intended to have
the prohibitive effect given it by the court in that case." He calls
attention to the fact that § 55 of the New York Property Law is sub-
stantially the same as the California law,' yet since the landmark case
of Kalish v. Kalish" the New York courts have been deciding in favor
of acceleration and against intestacy."
An additional ground for refusing to accelerate the contingent
remainder of the plaintiff was assigned by the court to the fact that
her remainder was contingent upon defendant's death without leaving
issue. In doing so, the court proceeds upon the antique theory that in
relation to the distribution of property, the termination of trusts, and
the rule against perpetuities, the law conclusively presumes that a
woman is capable of bearing children regardless of her age or
physical condition. The doctrine, although repudiated by the Re-
statement " and by the United States Supreme Court in deciding tax
matters," is still the majority rule in America, 9 and in circumstances
like those found in the instant case (hysterectomies performed) re-
presents the unwarranted preservation of an unrealistic anomaly in
Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence.
Frederick R. Hodosh
10 64 Cal. App.2d 767, 149 P.2d 485 (1944) (since there was no residuary
legacy or devise, the testatrix died intestate as to that portion of the estate
which her husband would have received under the will if he had not con-
tested it).
21 In order to cut off intestate rights there must be found in the will an intent
to make a valid gift to other persons of the property which otherwise would
pass in intestacy. In re Martin's Will, 95 N.Y.S. 2d 260 (N.Y. Surr. 1949);
Strohm v. McMullen, 404 Ill. 453, 89 N.E.2d 383 (1949); In re Martz'
Estate, 318 Mich. 293, 28 N.W.2d 108 (1947).
12 See note 8 supra.
33 Simes, The Acceleration of Future Interests, 41 Yale L.J. 659 (1932).
24 Id. at 673, n. 34.
"s 166 N.Y. 368, 59 N.E. 917 (1901).
20 In re Durand's Will, 250 N.Y. 45, 164 N.E. 737 (1928); In re Cashman's
Estate, 153 Misc. 374, 275 N.Y.Supp. 831 (1934); Bank of New York
v. Palmer, 269 App. Div. 229, 54 N.Y.S.2d 902 (1945).
1? 2 Restatement, Trusts § 340, comment e; 3 Restatement, Property § 274.
is United States v. Provident Trust Co., 291 U.S. 272 (1934).
19 Adamson v. Wolfe, 200 Ark. 360, 139 S.W.2d 674 (1940); In re Ster-
rett's's Estate, 300 Pa. 116, 150 Atl. 159 (1930).
